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of those species other than human. 'Empathy' has
referred and will refer to the act of imagining the
experiences, thoughts, and emotions of another from
the other's point of view. A 'dynamic agent' will
denote a being which makes decisions affecting its
own existence.
Our basic social skills are transmitted to us by those
who care for us before we begin to make our own moral
and interpersonal decisions. According to Jean Piaget,
this ability begins to manifest itself between the ages
of seven and twelve, during which children reach a state
of concrete operations, a state in which a consistent view
of life events begins to emerge (Papalia 24). The ability
to make these decisions becomes more refined as
children mature and reach a stage of formal operations,
[learn to deal with abstracts as well as concrete
situations] (24). Research consistently shows that
children recognize [and usually imitate] the social
norms of their communities. Proponents of both social
learning theories and cognitive development theories
agree on this point.
The social learning theory, which emphasizes that
children are encouraged to imitate adult behaviors,
provides us with strong evidence to suggest that children
do in fact imitate these behaviors. What is most
interesting, perhaps, is that children seem to imitate
behaviors which give no direct benefit to them (Bandura
589-95). Imitation without direct benefit seems to imply

We tend to act upon what we believe to be true. When
we deal with the world, we do so in a way which retlects
our view of the world. This view has largely been
transmitted to us by those who have cared for us as
children. Our parents and guardians bave shared with
us a great deal of information including, to some degree,
our methods for dealing with other sentient beings, both
human and nonhuman.
As we matured, we were faced with the moral
problem of animal exploitation. For most of us, this
problem appeared long after we had begun to use
animals in everyday life. We were not given the
information with which to make a rational decision
regarding the treatment of nonhumans. We found this
information later in life. As a society, we do not provide
children with the information necessary to later make
rational choices regarding the treatment of animals.
We do not give children an opportunity to empathize
with nonbumans.
Before we continue, we should define a few basic
terms. I will use the terms 'human' and 'person' more
or less interchangeably to refer to rational persons and
those who will become rational persons. I will use the
words 'animal' and 'nonhuman' to refer to members
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that children gain some indirect benefit from mimicking
the actions of their guardians.
The cognitive developmentalist stresses the role of
understanding to behavior in children. According to the
tenets of this view, children want to become dynamic
agents in their own lives. They gain underslanding of
adult thought processes by imitating adult actions. They
become dynamic agents in part by imitating these adult
behaviors and demonstrating their new found
competence to the community (Gleinnan 406-07).
Unfortunately, the desire to be 'grown-up' can lead
to problems. The desire to imitate adult behaviors is
ingrained before the child is able to consider the reasons
for this desire. [To the cognitive developmentalist, the
former entails the latter]. Put simply, children attempt
to imitate rational behavior before they themselves are
rational creatures. Six year-old Jane may envy the fact
that her older sister can drive a car, but Jane might not
consider that she herself cannot even reach lhe pedals.
If Jane should decide to drive the family car, there
will be trouble.
Another major disadvantage of this tendency to
imitate is that children learn both desirable and
undesirable behaviors. How often have we found that
the children around us imitate our bad habits? Some
children return from family gatherings with· 'colorful
phrases' which their parents had never intended for them
to hear. These phrases have an effect, when spoken by
an adult, upon an adult audience. Children quickly find
that they can also produce noticeable results by using
these phrases on an adult audience. Many an
embarrdssed parent would agree that a noticeable result
is not always a desirable result.
This tendency has consequences far outreaching the
trivial. Imitation may be a vital factor in cases of sexual
abuse. According to studies conducted by P. K. Trickett
and E. J. Susman, many abusers were abused as children
(274). These persons have learned a tool for interpersonal relationships which, unfortunately, has lead
them to perpetuate a cycle of abuse.
On a more positive note, imitation can also be a
factor which promotes beneficial social skills later in
life. If the imitation of negative factors leads to the
development of negative personality traits, it would
seem safe to assume tllat imitation of some positive
factors might lead to ilie development of positive
personality traits. Early education emphasizes
interpersonal skills, including cooperation, sharing and
empathy. In a 1989 poll, researchers found that parents
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ranked "sympailiy, empathy, [and] concern for others"
as one of the top three ideal goals of a preschool
environment (Papalia 205). Certainly, these are noble
goals, but which beings does the term 'others' include?
Do we even allow most children to consider animals
as targets for empathy? Rarely. Do we permit ourselves,
as a whole, to consider nonhumans as beings which
may have 'human' experiences? Rarely. And when we
do concede that nonhumans have similarities to humans,
do we accentuate these similarities? Almost never.
Both the 'moral point of view' and the utilitarian
viewpoint require a developed sense of empathy
(Pluhar). Our ability to recognize suffering in other
beings and respond to this suffering stems from our
ability to place ourselves into the situation of another
being. There can be no true recognition of suffering, in
others, without a previous experience of suffering in
self. Likewise, iliere can be no true recognition of
pleasure, in others, without a previous experience of
pleasure in self.
The suffering which humans have caused to
nonhuman animals has in part arisen from an inability,
or at least an unwillingness, to empailiize wiili animals.
The Cartesians justified vivisection on ilie grounds that
the animals they were vivisecting did not truly feel pain
(14). To hold such a view, the Cartesians were forced
to deny the evidence of their senses, forced to deny
themselves the experience of empathy. A cry of pain,
by a dog, is recognizable as such even to a small child.
Had a Cartesian allowed himself a dog's pointof view,
he would have looked at vivisection very differently.
We humans prefer to separate ourselves from ilie
animals which we exploit. Ronald McDonald doesn't
carry around a butcher's knife or a cattle prod on
television. Frank Perdue has dedicated himself to ilie
proposition iliat consumers need not remember that they
are eating animals. This February, an issue of People
magazine featured a full-page Perdue ad extolling ilie
virtues of skinless, boneless poultry products. As ilie
caption reads, iliere is "no dis-assembly required" (44).
Funny, I had always iliought ilie word for separating
skin from tlesh and tlesh from bone was 'dissection.'
Cartoons and illustrations almost always replace
live animals in food advertisements, especially if the
advertisements involve a suggestion of killing. Few
people could describe, with any accuracy, the behavior
of a mink living in ilie wild. You may find, as I have,
that most popular uses of the word 'mink' are
followed by the word 'coat' or 'stole.' Even pesticide

115

Between the Species

Giving Children a Choice: A Proposal for Developing Empathy

commercials and advertisements caricaturize insects
as being deliberately malicious. How easy to kill a rat
terrorizing your loved ones, how much harder to kill
an animal building itself a home.
In each of the above cases, the advertiser has tried
to distance the consumer from any chance to empathize
with an animal's suffering. Slaughterhouse films
simply do not sell cheeseburgers. These observations
may seem obvious, but they become important
considerations when we want to encourage empathy
with nonhuman animals.
Our exposure to dead animals comes mostly in the
form of food and clothing. As a species, we see most
living animals as unfinished products-products
which we finish by killing and then processing.
Animals become a function of how we may use or
dispose of them. Unfortunately, most children mature
exposed to such a situation. Many of us were raised in
such a situation.
Western civilization goes to great lengths to
divorce the experiences of being a human from the
experiences of being a nonhuman. Separation of
human and nonhuman is intrinsic among some of the
words ~ith which humans describe that which is
distasteful to us. Such slurs often attack the intelligence
of the target. The names of nonhuman animals
commonly describe qualities which we do not admire
in human individuals. Take, for example the French
betise. The word is a derivative of bete, or beast. Taken
literally, the word denotes an 'animal' or irrational
frame of mind (Collins 27). Betise, translated strictly,
means "animalish." In everyday language, the word
is a derogatory term comparable to the English "dumbox," or idiot.
Peter Singer has made an important point about the
distance we keep from the animals which our
civilization eats. In Animal Liberation, he describes the
care with which humans change the names of the flesh
they eat from the barnyard [or, more likely, factory],
to the table. I doubt that many young children have a
clear indication of what 'veal' is. 'Ground beef' or,
'hamburger,' has little obvious relationship to the animal
from which it comes.
We do call the fleshes of birds and fish by their
original names when we serve them as food, However,
the experiences of being either an aquatic creature or
a bird are not quite as similar to the experiences of
being a human as are tlle experiences of being a landbound manlffial.
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The extent of our empathy must depend, in part,
upon the extent of the similarities which we recognize
between ourselves and other beings. At the very least,
those beings with which humans empathize must be
sentient. If we do not recognize any similarities, we
cannot empathize at all. If our experiences are almost
completely alien to those with which we would like to
empathize, little rapport with such beings can be made.
It is very difficult, for example, to empathize with
an ant. We can recognize shared sensations such as pain,
light, and sense of smell, but beyond such basics, we
can not truly take the viewpoint of an ant. We can
certainly speculate upon experiences foreign to our own,
but our speculations will be vague, uncertain.
How are children exposed to animals? What sort of
model do we provide for them, so that they might take
our example? In most cases, humans are not exposed
to Hving animals at all. At the age of three or four, most
children have had little contact with animals, except
for contact with house pets. Aside from those animals
which we keep as pets, and those which coexist with us
on a daily basis [such as rodents, birds and insects], we
rarely encounter other species. Those species which we
do encounter are likely to be considered "pests," such
as flies, rats or roaches. Even those species which do
no direct harm to humans, such as sparrows or pigeons,
seem annoying to some.
How can a child connect the act of eating meat to
the act of killing an animal when the child has little
or no exposure to living animals? We shield children
from the very existence of the slaughterhouse. Our
language and, our treatment of those species with
which we coexist give little indication, to children,
that they are eating things which were once living,
breathing creatures.
As I know from personal experience, it is easier to
consider eating a 'cheeseburger' than it is to justify
eating a piece of 'ground, dead cow covered with
fennented cow excretions.'
The conscious recognition of shared experience is
almost a synonym for empathy among beings. When
this acknowledgment does not occur, empathy cannot
occur. When we direct our imagination towards the lives
of other species, our empathetic impulses are directly
limited by our knowledge of the experiences of these
other species.
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that children
embrace the thinking which underlies animal
exploitation. The shock of discovering oneself a killer
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is considerably lessened by a taste for beef or a fear of
spiders. Even more importantly, animals are not seen
as beings with which empathy can occur. This mentality,
after denying the relationship of human experience to
nonhuman experience, takes the following form:

Perhaps if we expose children to nonhuman animals
earlier, as dynamic beings, with an equitable emphasis
upon the similarities between humans and nonhumans,
these children will be less likely to dismiss nonhumans
as unworthy of any moral consideration. Let us be
realistic. At the very least, children will be able to
consider animals as beings, and not as products.
We need not try to 'sell' any sort of moral code
to children or adolescents in order to increase
empathy. We need not try to shock or traumatize
children either. We simply need to examine those
structures which view animals as products, and insist,
in the interest of truthfulness, that such structures be
altered to reflect the fact that animals are beings. We
cannot expect children to empathize with static
objects or products. If we inform our children that
an animal's value depends upon its usefulness to
humans, our children will treat animals as products.
We need to demonstrate that each sentient being has
an existence unto itself, more vital than its relationship to humankind.
Granted, to do this will not bring an immediate
end to Ule suffering which humans cause nonhumans.
To do this will not bring an immediate change to the
way in which most humans view other species. But to
do this, ultimately, will be to break down some of the
artificial barriers which now separate the human
experience of living from the nonhuman experience
of living.

A. Nonhuman beings can be in a combination of
four states: liVing or dead, captive or wild.
B. Nonhumans which are liVing captives provide
either amusement for humans, targets for
experimentation, or food.
Nonhumans which are both living and wild
become a nuisance, a danger, a possible
'product,' a target of 'sport,' or else they exit
the scope of human affairs altogether. [While
incomplete in an ecological sense, tllis view is
nevertheless popular].
D. Animals which are captive and dead [at least
those killed by humans] are a source of food
and clothing. At the very least, they are to be
discarded as a health threat.
E. Animals which are wild and dead [which would
be quite a contradiction if the words were being
used differently] have littIe or no interest to
humans oUler than as a potential source ofdisease.

e.

Although these premises have numerous pitfalls and
inaccuracies when taken, Ule thinking behind these
premises is widespread.
For many, tIle decision to stop exploiting animals
begins with an appeal to empathy. However, as I have
mentioned, animals are not someUling with which we
are encouraged to empathize.
In many cases, nonhumans are presented side-byside WiUl tlle relative advantages and disadvantages which
they provide for humans. The Funk & Wagnalls
encyclopedia provides a useful example of this. The word
rodent is followed by a definition of about two-hundred
words. This definition consisL~ of a biological description,
a few sentences which describe rodent habitats, and a
description of tIle ways in which various rodents benefit
or harm humans (320-21). Some of the rodents described
on these pages sound as if they were being advertised.
Others sound as if they should be exterminated from the
planet. In tlle context of this description, the rodem is a
function of its usefulness to humanity.
111at a rodent is a dynamic agent in its own existence
never enters the definition. That a rodent exists independent ofhuman intervention never enters the definition.
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